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Classical cognitive theories hold that word representations in the brain are abstract and
amodal, and are independent of the objects’ sensorimotor properties they refer to. An
alternative hypothesis emphasizes the importance of bodily processes in cognition: the
representation of a concept appears to be crucially dependent upon perceptual-motor
processes that relate to it. Thus, understanding action-related words would rely upon the
samemotor structures that also support the execution of the same actions. In this context,
motor simulation represents a key component. Our approach is to draw parallels between
the literature on mental rotation and the literature on action verb/sentence processing.
Here we will discuss recent studies on mental imagery, mental rotation, and language that
clearly demonstrate how motor simulation is neither automatic nor necessary to language
understanding. These studies have shown that motor representations can or cannot be
activated depending on the type of strategy the participants adopt to perform tasks involv-
ing motor phrases. On the one hand, participants may imagine the movement with the
body parts used to carry out the actions described by the verbs (i.e., motor strategy); on
the other, individuals may solve the task without simulating the corresponding movements
(i.e., visual strategy).While it is not surprising that the motor strategy is at work when par-
ticipants process action-related verbs, it is however striking that sensorimotor activation
has been reported also for imageable concrete words with no motor content, for “non-
words” with regular phonology, for pseudo-verb stimuli, and also for negations. Based on
the extant literature, we will argue that implicit motor imagery is not uniquely used when a
body-related stimulus is encountered, and that it is not the type of stimulus that automat-
ically triggers the motor simulation but the type of strategy. Finally, we will also comment
on the view that sensorimotor activations are subjected to a top-down modulation.
Keywords: motor simulation, word representations, action understanding, imagery, cognitive strategies
INTRODUCTION
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have iden-
tified regions in sensorimotor cortex that are activated preferen-
tially by action-related words but also for words with no motor
content. The extent to which these patterns of activation are
modulated by bottom-up or top-down mechanisms is currently
unknown. Many cognitive processes rely on both“bottom-up”and
“top-down” processing. One example is found in the mental rota-
tion domain in which bottom-up processing is first triggered by
the stimulus category, and then continues until sensorimotor or
visuospatial operations are engaged. On the other hand, top-down
processing refers to the modulatory effect exerted by cognitive
strategies, which can be implicitly adopted by participants while
solving the task at hand. Accordingly, motor representations can or
cannot be activated depending on the type of strategy the partic-
ipants adopt to perform tasks involving bodily – and non-bodily
related stimuli. Whether the same pattern, speaking for a top-down
modulation of sensorimotor activation depending on strategy (or
contextual) factors might be applied to the action-related word
processing domain is currently under debate. Despite growing
research efforts, the actual cause of the observed motor system
activity during action word processing remains elusive (Kemmerer
and Gonzalez-Castillo, 2010). Some authors argue that the action-
related aspects of a word’s meaning are represented in and around
the motor strip and that these regions are automatically and invari-
ably activated when action words are encountered, and should not
be modulated by attentional demands, i.e., associationist theory
(Pulvermuller et al., 2001, 2005a; Pulvermuller, 2005). Sensorimo-
tor activations observed during language processing reflect how
word meaning is stored in the brain. According to embodied the-
ories of cognition, sensory-motor systems play an important role
in the representation of concepts (Lakoff, 1987; Glenberg, 1997;
Barsalou, 1999; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Glenberg and Kaschak,
2002; Feldman and Narayanan, 2004; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005).
A bold version of embodiment theory (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005)
does not just assume that our concepts can be represented in senso-
rimotor systems but rather that they are the sensorimotor systems.
Secondary, embodied proposals argue that word meaning is linked
to sensorimotor experience derived from the motor and percep-
tual simulation during comprehension; however, these simulation
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processes are not a reflection of how meaning is represented
(Mahon and Caramazza, 2008). Versions of embodied theories
(Barsalou et al., 2008; Borghi and Cimatti, 2009; Dove, 2009;
Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2010; Borghi, 2012) based on a mixed
view of how concepts are represented, propose that both amodal
and modal conceptual representations coexist in conceptual pro-
cessing, i.e., a “representational pluralism”; they also extend the
embodied view of cognition to account not only for language
grounding but also for the social and normative aspects of cogni-
tion (Borghi and Cimatti, 2009; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2012).
However, it is still not clear how these recent theoretical develop-
ments can account for the lack of sensorimotor activation in some
of the action-related word processing studies. Although simulation
and associative learning theories are difficult to tease apart (e.g.,
Keysers and Perrett, 2004; Brass and Heyes, 2005), the contribu-
tion of the top-down strategic modulation might be a promising
approach to investigate the interaction between the language and
motor systems. With respect to whether the motor areas activation
is bottom-up, both the embodied cognition theory and associ-
ationist theory lead to identical predictions. On both accounts
the activation of the sensorimotor areas observed in several fMRI
studies investigating action-related word processing is maintained
to be stimulus-dependent (Hauk et al., 2004; Pulvermuller, 2005;
Ruschemeyer et al., 2007; Kemmerer and Gonzalez-Castillo, 2010).
Thus different mental operations may be at work during language
processing depending on whether the stimulus type is an action-
related word or a non-action word. By contrast, the associationist
theory is certainly not in agreement with the top-down hypoth-
esis. According to the associationist theory (Pulvermuller et al.,
2001, 2005a; Pulvermuller, 2005), the activation of the sensorimo-
tor cortex“should not require people to attend to language stimuli,
but should instead be automatic” (Pulvermuller et al., 2005b). The
top-down hypothesis instead holds that motor activation is not
automatically triggered by the type of stimulus but by the type of
strategy. Also the embodied cognition hypothesis, as it claims that
“understanding” is sensory and motor simulation, is not compat-
ible with the view that the type of strategy selected depends on
top-down modulation of the context and tasks demands. Rather
the top-down hypothesis is in line with the disembodied view the
motor system may be activated but not necessarily so (Mahon and
Caramazza, 2005, 2008).
Although previous studies also point to an involvement of the
premotor cortex (PM) in processing action verbs (e.g., Tettamanti
et al., 2005, 2008; Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006), in the present review
article we were primarily interested in the neural response pattern
of the (left) M1 cortex, given the susceptibility of this region to
top-down modulation (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 2001).
A LESSON FROMMENTAL ROTATION
BOTTOM-UP HYPOTHESIS
Bottom-up and top-down processes have specifically been trig-
gered in studies that aimed at investigating whether the recruit-
ment of motor representations in mental rotation depends on the
stimuli, or on the particular mental operation adopted in solving
the task, respectively. Although mental rotation (hereafter MR) is
generally held to be under conscious control (Cooper and Shep-
ard, 1973), there is also evidence that part of the processing escapes
awareness. One way to go about characterizing the MR operations
is to evaluate whether they differentially respond to the type of
stimulus that is mentally rotated (Kosslyn et al., 1998; Rumiati
et al., 2001; Tomasino et al., 2003), the reference frame (Wraga
et al., 1999; Zacks et al., 1999, 2002), or to the type of strategy
(Kosslyn et al., 2001).
The standard view has long maintained that the mechanisms
involved in MR were essentially bottom-up, that is externally trig-
gered by low-level information derived from the stimuli to be
rotated (we will refer to this as the type of stimulus hypothesis).
Three are the types of stimulus used in MR experiments: the 2D
alphanumeric characters, 3D abstract pictures such as cubes and
body parts such as hand shapes. All these stimuli can elicit two
types of MR mechanisms (Kosslyn et al., 1998): (i) object-based
spatial transformations, and (ii) egocentric perspective transfor-
mations. The former MR mechanism generates simulated rota-
tions of, for instance, hands, remodeled as reaching movements
in which subjects implicitly turn their own hands into correspon-
dence with the pictured hand stimulus (Parsons et al., 1995, 1998;
Kosslyn et al., 1998; Parsons and Fox, 1998). By contrast, the latter
mechanism corresponds to imagined movements of one’s point of
view, generally used for mentally rotating external abstract pictures
in the visual space, without the need of a motor simulation (Zacks
et al., 2002, 2003). Thus, different operations may be recruited
in MR depending on whether the stimulus type is a body part
or a two or three-dimensional object (Parsons et al., 1995, 1998;
Kosslyn et al., 1998; Parsons and Fox, 1998).
Neuropsychological studies documented a double dissociation
between the processes underlying these two types of transfor-
mations, each of which can be selectively affected as a result of
brain damage. In a group study, patients with right brain damage
(RBD) showed impaired MR of external objects (e.g., a puppet and
flag shapes), while patients with left brain damage (LBD) showed
impaired MR of hands (Tomasino et al., 2003). These results are
compatible with single case reports. On the one hand, patient MT,
with left hemisphere brain damage, was described as being selec-
tively impaired at left or right hand decisions despite being still able
to mentally rotate Shepard and Metzler’s stimuli (Rumiati et al.,
2001). On the other hand, patient JB, with a bilateral inferotem-
poral lesion, was also observed as having a deficit in performing
MR of Shepard and Metzler’s stimuli (Sirigu and Duhamel, 2001).
However, the ability to mentally rotate motor images of body parts
was not investigated in JB or in other posterior left (Kosslyn et al.,
1985; Metha and Newcombe, 1991; Morton and Morris, 1995) or
right (Ratcliff, 1979; Farah et al., 1988; Ditunno and Mann, 1990;
Bricolo et al., 2000) brain-damaged patients with a MR deficit.
Consistently with the notion that MR operations interact
with the type of stimulus, neuroimaging research has provided
in vivo evidence that different types of stimuli trigger different
mental rotation-related clusters (Kosslyn et al., 1998). Using the
Positron Emission Tomography (PET), these authors monitored
the regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) of healthy subjects dur-
ing two mental rotation tasks. In the first task, subjects compared
and decided whether two angular branching forms (i.e., Shepard–
Metzler cubes) had the same (baseline) or different orientations
(rotation condition), while in a second task stimuli used were
line drawings of hand shapes. Mentally rotating branching forms
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enhanced bilateral activation in the right parietal lobe and in Brod-
mann Area (BA) 19, whereas mentally rotating hands enhanced
unilateral left activation in the precentral gyrus (M1), most of the
parietal lobe, the primary visual cortex, the insula, and frontal BAs
6 (PM) and 9 (superior frontal cortex). Kosslyn et al. (1998) pro-
posed that at least two independent mechanisms are engaged in the
mental rotation of hands and objects, one requiring processes that
prepare motor movements, and one that does not, and that motor
processes are recruited only when participants mentally rotated
hands but not when they mentally rotated Shepard and Metzler’s
stimuli.
Psychophysical evidence too demonstrated that hands are a
special type of stimulus. Response times during MR of body parts
reflect the degree of awkwardness associated to the orientation of
the hand stimulus and the length of the imagined path (Parsons,
1987, 1994; Parsons et al., 1995). This reaction time (RTs) pattern
provides the evidence that subjects imagine a spatial transforma-
tion of their own body part from its actual orientation until it
matches the stimulus orientation. By contrast, the effect of biolog-
ical constraints on RTs has never been found during MR of external
objects, thus suggesting that MR may recruit different mechanisms
depending on the type of stimuli involved in the mental transfor-
mation. Accordingly, MR of hands, but not of objects, implicitly
triggers sensorimotor imagery rather than visuospatial imagery
alone.
The view that MR operations are differentially triggered
depending on the type of stimulus to be rotated, as suggested by
the above reviewed studies, was soon modified following a neu-
roimaging study (Kosslyn et al., 2001) in which it was argued that
the left M1 was not recruited for mentally rotating only body parts
such as hand shapes, but also non-body-part stimuli such as exter-
nal abstract objects (Cohen et al., 1996; Tagaris et al., 1996; Richter
et al., 1997; Carpenter et al., 1999; Lamm et al., 2001; Vingerhoets
et al., 2001), even though subjects were not explicitly instructed
to use a particular strategy (Kosslyn et al., 2001). Kosslyn et al.
(2001) argued that subjects might have spontaneously adopted a
motor strategy, accounting thus for these results. This (Kosslyn
et al., 2001) and other studies (Wraga et al., 2003; Tomasino and
Rumiati, 2004; Tomasino et al., 2004) that soon followed paved
the way to the formulation of the top-down hypothesis, as we will
discuss in the following section.
TOP-DOWN HYPOTHESIS
According to the top-down hypothesis, higher-level mechanisms
guide individuals to select the most suitable cognitive strategy that
allows them to solve MR tasks. Thus the original view that differ-
ent MR mechanisms are elicited depending on the type of stimulus
under rotation, has later been replaced by the hypothesis that this
selection mechanism rather depends on the frame of reference or
the type of strategy used in imagining inanimate objects rotat-
ing (Kosslyn et al., 2001; Zacks et al., 2002, 2003). This top-down
hypothesis holds that there could be at least two strategies involved
in MR. One strategy encompasses imagining what one would see if
he/she manipulates an object, the other implicates imagining what
one would see if someone else, or an external force, manipulates
an object (Kosslyn et al., 2001). In that PET study (Kosslyn et al.,
2001), subjects mentally rotated Shepard and Metzler stimuli using
either an external strategy or an internal strategy. Before perform-
ing this MR task, subjects either viewed an electric motor device
rotating the 3D cube (external action) or they rotated it manually
(internal action). Afterward, subjects performed the MR by imag-
ining grasping the object, and turning it with their own hand, or
by mentally viewing the stimulus as if it were being rotated by
an electric motor device. The same region that in Kosslyn et al.’s
(1998) PET study was activated in association with MR of hands
only – the left primary motor cortex – here was enhanced when
subjects simulated a manual rotation of the Shepard and Metzler’s
stimuli.
Neuropsychological evidence further supported the view that
what matters in MR is the type of strategy adopted (Tomasino
and Rumiati, 2004). Patients with unilateral brain lesions and
healthy control subjects were instructed to adopt a motor (ego-
centric transformation) and, in a different block, a visual strategy
(allocentric transformation) when performing MR of hand shapes
(Experiment 1) or Shepard and Metzler’s stimuli (Experiment 2).
Independent of the type of stimulus, LBD patients showed a selec-
tive deficit in MR either hands and 3D cubes as a consequence of
their manual activity, whereas RBD patients performed patholog-
ically on a MR task in which they were required to apply a visual
strategy (Tomasino and Rumiati, 2004). This study showed how
MR could be achieved by recruiting different strategies, implicitly
triggered or prompted at will, and each sustained by a unilateral
brain network.
How can we reconcile the neuropsychological findings, sup-
porting the view that MR is a lateralized process which depends
on the type of stimulus (Tomasino et al., 2003), with those in
favor of MR as depending on the strategy adopted (Kosslyn et al.,
2001; Tomasino and Rumiati, 2004)? While in Tomasino et al.
(2003) LBD patients were impaired at mentally rotating hands but
not external objects, and RBD patients showed the opposite pat-
tern, in a subsequent study (Tomasino and Rumiati, 2004), LBD
patients, explicitly encouraged to apply either the motor strat-
egy or the visual strategy, failed to rotate both types of stimuli
when the operation was solved by means of a motor strategy, but
succeeded when the alternative visual strategy was selected. As
Kosslyn et al. (1998) argued, in the absence of clear instructions,
participants spontaneously adopt one or the other strategy to per-
form MR. According to whether the mental operation intrinsically
requires imagining limb movements (somatomotor operation) or
the motion of visual objects (visuospatial operation), MR can be
solved via motor or visual strategy. Thus both bottom-up and
top-down strategies are used in MR, and their selection seems to
depend on task settings, instructions, and other variables. Partici-
pants may voluntarily adopt one or the other strategy if prompted
by the experimenter but, in a free choice paradigm, the preferred
strategy can also be stimulus-dependent. When subjects are not
instructed to adopt a given strategy, the type of stimulus deter-
mines which one is going to be selected moreover, these strategies
can be implicitly transferred from one type of MR to another,
and lateralization might vary according to the order of block pre-
sentation (Wraga et al., 2003). Transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) studies have shown that stimulation over the left M1 slowed
down MR of hands but not of letters (Tomasino et al., 2005) or
feet (Ganis et al., 2000). In Tomasino et al.’s (2005) study, subjects
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were free to apply one or the other strategy, with the instructions
requiring them to mentally rotate the stimulus on the right, and
decide whether it was the same or a mirror image of the other.
Since an interference effect due to stimulation was obtained only
during MR of hands, it was held that hands implicitly require a
mental motor transformation. By contrast, since TMS interferes
with MR of hand shapes but not of letters, it has been argued
that alphanumeric characters do not implicitly require a men-
tal motor strategy (i.e., viewer-based) but rather a visuospatial
strategy (i.e., object-based). Moreover, brain tumor patients with
selective lesions, selectively affecting the hand sensorimotor rep-
resentation, failed to mentally rotate hand shapes, but not letters,
if they were free to use any cognitive strategy; this deficit, how-
ever, extended to abstract objects when the patients imagined
moving them with their own hands, while maintaining the abil-
ity to visualize them rotating in space (Tomasino et al., 2010a).
These neuropsychological findings provide conclusive evidence
that discrete brain areas can be selectively recruited according to
the strategy that is implicitly adopted while solving a cognitive
task.
TOP-DOWNMODULATORY EFFECTS IN OTHER COGNITIVE DOMAINS
That partially discrete brain networks can support different cog-
nitive operations depending on their purpose has been demon-
strated in other cognitive domains. For instance, the visual infor-
mation can be used either for identifying objects (along the “what”
stream) or for guiding action (along the “how” stream; Milner
and Goodale, 1995). These authors described a patient, DF, with
visual form agnosia caused by a bilateral occipital lesion, as being
severely impaired at perceptually judging the orientation of a line
as well as at showing with her fingers the dimensions of objects that
were visually presented; however, she was able to orient her hand
in a posting task as well as to execute normal reaching-grasping
movements (Goodale et al., 1991; Milner and Goodale, 1995). The
opposite pattern was observed in patient RV, with a bilateral occip-
ital lesion, who failed to grasp objects whose visual shape he was
almost perfectly able to identify (Goodale et al., 1994).
The existence of different networks specialized in carrying out
the same cognitive operation according to its purpose is supported
by different sources of evidence. For instance, it has been shown
that differential neural mechanisms were enhanced when subjects
solved the line bisection task either manually (action) or as per-
ceptual judgments (vision; Weiss et al., 2003). In particular, in the
latter condition, a unilateral activation of the right inferior parietal
cortex, anterior cingulate, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, including
also the extrastriate and superior temporal cortex bilaterally, was
observed. By contrast, the manual bisection task enhanced acti-
vation in the extrastriate, superior parietal, and premotor cortices
bilaterally.
Finally, it has been shown how hemispheric specialization
might be dependent upon the nature of the task rather than on
the nature of the stimulus (Stephan et al., 2003). In their fMRI
study, 16 right-handed volunteers performed two different tasks
on an identical set of four letter words, three of which written in
black and either the second or third letter in red. While in the
letter-decision task, the participants were asked to ignore the posi-
tion of the red letter and indicate whether or not the displayed
word contained the target letter “A,” in the visuospatial-decision
task, they were required to ignore the language-related proper-
ties of the words and to judge whether the red letter was located
left or right of the center of the word. Comparing letters in the
visuospatial-decision task led to a significantly higher activation in
the left inferior frontal gyrus, occipital cortex, ventral PM (PMv),
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and supplementary motor cortex.
In contrast, visuospatial decisions compared with letter decisions
significantly increased the activation in the anterior and posterior
parts of the right inferior parietal lobule. For the authors this func-
tional dissociation suggests that the cognitive control mechanisms
differentially directs attention to specific stimulus features and
guide the subsequent information processing. When they analyzed
the frontal regions responsible for cognitive control, an increased
coupling between left ACC and left inferior frontal gyrus was found
for letter decisions, and between the right ACC and right parietal
areas for visuospatial decisions (Stephan et al., 2003). To conclude,
the plasticity with which the brain adapts to the different tasks
and contexts, and switches between hemispheres, in the studies
reviewed above is comparable with the one found in the mental
rotation domain (Tomasino and Rumiati, 2004).
MENTAL ROTATION AND ACTION-RELATED WORD
PROCESSING
BOTTOM-UP HYPOTHESIS
The recruitment of the sensorimotor areas observed in several
fMRI studies investigating action-related word processing has
been interpreted as being stimulus-dependent (Hauk et al., 2004;
Ruschemeyer et al., 2007; Kemmerer and Gonzalez-Castillo, 2010).
For example, lexical decisions about action verbs, i.e., to judge
whether a verb is a real word or a pseudoword, were found to
lead to stronger high-frequency EEG activity at recording sites
located closely above primary motor (M1) cortex (Pulvermuller
et al., 2001). Interestingly, action words related to different body
parts, i.e., face, arm, or leg movements, compared with non-
action words, activated the primary motor cortex and the PM
in a somatotopic manner (Hauk et al., 2004; Buccino et al., 2005;
Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006). Listening to sentences expressing actions
performed with the mouth, the hand, or the foot led to signal
increased in different parts of the left PM depending on the effec-
tor involved in the action described in the sentence (Tettamanti
et al., 2005; Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006). TMS of the left M1 causes
similar effector-specific M1 modulation during listening to hand
and foot action-related sentences (Buccino et al., 2005), and dur-
ing a lexical decision task (Pulvermuller et al., 2005b). In addition,
the activation of the left M1 increased for action words (verbs and
nouns) compared with non-action words (Oliveri et al., 2004).
Thus different mental operations may be at work during lan-
guage processing depending on whether the stimulus type is an
action-related word or a non-action related word. The sensorimo-
tor activation during language processing has been interpreted as
sensorimotor representations being an integral part of action word
representation (Pulvermuller, 2005). According to the proponents
of the associative learning approach (Pulvermuller, 2005), the acti-
vation of the sensorimotor cortex can play a specific functional
role in recognizing action words (p. 578, Pulvermuller, 2005).
Specifically, authors suggested that neurons in the fronto-central
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cortex differentially contribute to the semantic processing of
action words, and hence called them semantic neurons, located
in the inferior fronto-central cortex for face-related words, and in
the superior central cortex for leg-related words (consistent with
the known motor somatotopy; Pulvermuller, 2005).
A similar view is the one forwarded by the embodied hypoth-
esis of language understanding according to which conceptual
knowledge is grounded in sensory-motor systems (Barsalou, 1999;
Feldman and Narayanan, 2004; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005). This
idea is consistent with the view that word meaning is processed
in dedicated cortical areas (e.g., Martin et al., 1995, 1996), and is
in sharp contrast with the conceptual-level representation theory
(e.g., Pylyshyn, 1984; Fodor, 2001), which suggests that the mean-
ing of a verbally presented action is accessed through abstract
amodal units. The latter view emphasizes the abstract, amodal,
and symbolic character of concepts, which are thought to be rep-
resented outside the brain’s sensory-motor systems. According to
this view, concepts are not represented within the sensory and
motor systems – the (so-called) disembodied cognition hypothe-
sis. According to the disembodied cognition hypothesis, concep-
tual representations are “symbolic” and “abstract” and, as such,
qualitatively distinct. An intermediate position is represented by
the secondary embodiment, according to which amodal concep-
tual representations are instantiated by retrieving sensory and
motor information by an independent, but associated, seman-
tic system (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008). Lastly, recent theories
based on multiple types of representation (Barsalou et al., 2008;
Borghi and Cimatti, 2009; Dove, 2009; Louwerse and Jeuniaux,
2010; Borghi, 2012) propose the existence of both amodal and
modal conceptual representations in conceptual processing, i.e.,
a “representational pluralism” (Dove, 2009) they also extend the
embodied view of cognition to account not only for language
grounding but also for the social and normative aspects of cogni-
tion (Borghi and Cimatti, 2009; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2012).
However, it is still not clear how these recent theoretical develop-
ments can account for the lack of sensorimotor activation in some
of the action-related word processing. The view that sensorimo-
tor areas are activated depending on the type of word, has been
challenged by several studies which showed how the recruitment
of the sensorimotor areas is not automatic as held before (Pul-
vermuller et al., 2005b), but rather context-dependent (Tomasino
et al., 2007, 2008; Papeo et al., 2009; van Dam et al., 2010b, 2012;
Willems et al., 2010).
TOP-DOWN HYPOTHESIS
Similarly to what has been observed in the mental rotation domain,
individuals might be using different strategies in trying to under-
stand action-related words or phrases. One of these strategies
involves implicit simulation, that is a process that occurs when
subjects unconsciously simulate the movement while performing
another task, even in the absence of a precise instruction to do so
(Jeannerod and Frak, 1999). The tasks which have been found to
elicit implicit simulation are: mental rotation of body parts (e.g.,
Zacks et al., 1999; Kosslyn et al., 2001), handedness recognition of
a visually presented hand (e.g., Parsons and Fox, 1998), judgments
as to whether an action would be easy, difficult, or impossible
(Johnson-Frey et al., 2002), and recognizing and understanding
actions of other individuals (e.g., Jeannerod and Frak, 1999).
It has been suggested that implicit simulation activates effector-
specific regions in the PM cortex, presumably because it facilitates
further action planning whenever subsequent cues call for move-
ments to be explicitly executed or to be imagined (Willems et al.,
2010).
Consistently with the top-down hypothesis, when we are try-
ing to understand action-related words may implicitly imagine the
corresponding movement, thus triggering the underlying motor
representation. In the mental rotation domain, it has been shown
that if participants are not clearly instructed, it is the type of stim-
ulus that determines which strategy will be selected (Wraga et al.,
2003). In most of the fMRI experiments, evaluating the neural
correlates of action-related language processing (e.g., Hauk et al.,
2004; Buccino et al., 2005; Tettamanti et al., 2005), subjects were
not instructed to explicitly imagine themselves or somebody else
performing the movements. This, by itself, does not ensure that
they might have nevertheless implicitly performed motor imagery.
Thus, in the effort to control for putative motor imagery during
word processing, participants were asked to perform an imagery
task and a letter detection task with action and non-action verbs
and found that, the imagery task compared to the letter detection
task, led to an enhanced M1 activation for action verbs relative to
non-action related (Tomasino et al., 2007). In other studies, the
effector-specific activation of M1 was observed during semantic
judgments on action verbs, relative to task conditions where the
access to word meaning was less explicit or only incidental, e.g.,
letter detection or syllable counting (Papeo et al., 2009) or during
imagery, but not during lexical decision of action-related stimuli
(Willems et al., 2010), although authors found premotor activa-
tion during lexical decisions, consistently with results from a TMS
study in which authors found that stimulation of hand-related
PM modulated the processing of hand-related action verbs during
lexical decisions (Willems et al., 2011). Evidence for such strategic
effect has been recently found also on other brain networks during
reading (Cummine et al., 2012).
According to the idea we are trying to put forward here,different
task strategies cause participants to lean on different sensorimo-
tor representations. In a series of studies investigating different
aspects of language representations (e.g., morphology, grammar,
category specificity, semantics), we checked the type of task used
and whether M1 was explicitly reported among the activated areas
in the critical comparisons involving action verbs.
On the one hand, we identified a series of studies involving
action words or verbs in which no activation of M1 was found.
For instance, Perani et al. (1999) used a lexical decision task involv-
ing concrete and abstract verbs (presented in their infinitive form)
and nouns, and failed to find a selective activation of M1 when sub-
jects processed concrete verbs (e.g., to brush, to comb, to write).
Interestingly, making “pleasant/unpleasant” decisions about verbs
and nouns, presented either as stem or inflected (e.g., for verbs:
sing or sings), did not activate the M1 cortex for verbs relative to
nouns (Longe et al., 2007). Neither did a task requiring generating
a verb for a noun (Petersen et al., 1998). Other authors probed
the comprehension of motion verbs and found (compared to pseu-
dowords) stronger activity in the left ventral temporal-occipital
cortex, bilateral prefrontal cortex, and caudate; however, there
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was no activation of M1 (Grossman et al., 2002). Furthermore,
numerous neuroimaging studies found the middle/superior tem-
poral gyrus to be activated during action word generation (Martin
et al., 1995, 1996; Fiez et al., 1996; Tranel et al., 2005). Raposo
et al. (2009), for instance, showed that passive listening to arm-
and leg-related verbs, presented in isolation (e.g., kick), elicited
M1 activation in study 1, whereas that literal sentences (as in “kick
the ball”) and idiomatic sentences (as in “kick the bucket”), con-
structed using the same action verbs as in the single word study,
elicited M1 to a lesser extent in study 2. Differently from passive
listening of words presented in isolation, this latter task required
participants to listen to sentences and to decide on half of them
whether a visual probe word, presented on the screen a few sec-
onds after the end of the sentence, was related to the meaning of
the sentence. Interestingly, idiomatic sentences activated fronto-
temporal regions, associated with language processing, but not
motor and premotor cortices (Raposo et al., 2009). Passive lis-
tening and silent reading not always elicit M1 activation. Passive
listening of action-related literal sentences, e.g., “biting the peach”
as compared to metaphorical sentences including action words,
e.g., “biting off more that you can chew,” did not elicit any signif-
icant activation of M1 (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006). Other authors
instructed participants to silently read blocks of action words
related to specific effectors (e.g., punch, bite, or stomp), and items
with various levels of lexical information (non-body part-related
meanings, non-words, and visual character strings presented in
infinitive form) and, when a fixation cross or hashes were pre-
sented, to watch the stimuli without mentally reciting them (Postle
et al., 2008). They failed to find a somatotopic organization of
action-related language processing.
Other showed that passive listening to sentences describing
actions performed with the mouth, the hand, or the leg, and to
abstract sentences task (Tettamanti et al., 2005) activated the PM
but not the M1. Other authors used a silent reading of sentences
including manual action verbs plus a specific physical object pre-
sented in past, present, and future forms, as compared to abstract
verbs, followed by a reading comprehension task, involving ques-
tions referred to a temporal aspect of the sentence (e.g., “Is the
table currently being cleaned?”) in half of the cases and to a
non-temporal aspect (e.g., “Did the sentence refer to a piece of
furniture?”) in the remaining items. They found that irrespec-
tive of the tense, action-related sentences did not activate the
M1 cortex (Gilead et al., 2013). In another fMRI study, partici-
pants listened to sentences including a hand/arm action verb (e.g.,
grab, punch), a verb primarily visual in nature (e.g., read, browse),
and abstract verbs (e.g., allow, explain) and judged whether the
sentences were sensible, pressing a response button with their
left index finger only for sentences judged to be nonsense (Desai
et al., 2010). M1 cortex was not reported among the activated
areas neither for the motor vs. visual-related verbs contrast nor
for the motor vs. abstract related verbs contrast. In addition,
the overlap between areas activated in the motor localizer task
and those activated in the motor vs. visual-related verbs contrast,
motor vs. abstract related verbs contrast was found in the infe-
rior postcentral focus (Desai et al., 2010). It has been shown that,
while watching of short object-related action movies activated the
hand sensorimotor area bilaterally, listening to and producing short
sentences describing object-related actions and man-made objects
did not (Tremblay et al., 2003). Tremblay and Small (2011) found
a functional specialization within the PMv for observing actions
and for observing objects, and a different organization for pro-
cessing sentences describing actions and objects. In addition, the
generation of verbs with strong motor association, in a minimal
phrase context eliciting active semantic processing, as compared
to a rhyming task, did not trigger activations in motor-related
areas (Khader et al., 2010). Authors (Khader et al., 2010) reported
stronger activation for verb generation in the left superior tem-
poral gyrus. Other authors presented verbs denoting actions that
one performs mostly with hands involved in a general motor pro-
gram (e.g., to clean) or a more specific motor program (e.g., to
wipe), plus as control 20 mouth-related words (van Dam et al.,
2010a). Participants were instructed to read all words and per-
form a categorization task in which a go response should be made
only to verbs denoting a mouth action. Van Dam et al. failed to
report M1 cortex among the activated areas for the action-related
vs. abstract verbs contrast, independent of whether actions were
involved in a general motor program and more specific motor
program. In another fMRI study by the same authors, participants
were presented with (1) action words (i.e., words highly associated
with a specific action, such as stapler), (2) color words (i.e., words
highly associated with a specific color, such as wedding dress), and
(3) action-color words (i.e., words highly associated with both an
action and a color, such as tennis ball or boxing glove) and were
instructed to listen to all words carefully and to perform a go/no-
go semantic categorization task, in which go responses should be
made only to words denoting objects that were associated with
either a green color or a foot action (van Dam et al., 2012). These
authors found that when participants were instructed to focus
on the action performed on a word’s referent, as compared to
when they were instructed to focus on the object’s color, no M1
activation was reported within action areas. In another study, sub-
jects listened carefully to indirect requests (IRs) for action which
are speech acts in which access to an action concept is required,
although it is not explicitly encoded in the language, e.g., “It is
hot here!” in a room with a window is likely to be interpreted as a
request to open the window, while in a desert will be interpreted as
a statement, and were instructed to decide whether they think the
person wanted something from them or not (van Ackeren et al.,
2012). Van Ackeren et al. found that the comprehension of IR
sentences, as compared to sentences devoid of any implicit motor
information, activated cortical motor areas as the left SMA and IPL
bilateral, but not the M1 cortex. In another study by Moody and
Gennari (2010), participants read the stimulus sentences describ-
ing actions requiring more or less physical effort, e.g., pushing the
piano implies more physical effort than pushing the chair, and
occasionally answered comprehension questions requiring a yes/no
answer (e.g., did the man forget the piano?) by using their left
hand when responding. The M1 cortex was not found among
the regions activated by the items, while the premotor region was
sensitive to the degree of effort implied by the actions.
On the other hand, there are several studies in which the
M1 cortex has been reported among the regions activated by
action words/verbs/sentences related stimuli. In on one of them,
for instance, subjects (i) produced a verb corresponding to the
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presented noun (e.g., “drive” for “car”), and (ii) reading verbs and
nouns (Frings et al., 2006). These authors found that among other
areas, the M1 cortex was significantly activated during verb and
noun silent reading task. In another study, lexical decisions about
action verbs, i.e., to judge whether a verb is a real word or a pseudo-
word, led to stronger high-frequency EEG activity at recording sites
located closely above primary motor (M1) cortex (Pulvermuller
et al.,1999). If the processed action words are related to movements
of different body parts, then the strongest in-going EEG current
is detected close to the cortical representation of the respective
body part (Pulvermuller et al., 1999). Interestingly, such a soma-
totopic activation of M1 has also been reported when participants
silently read action words related to face, arm, or leg movements
(Hauk et al., 2004) and even when they were presented with action
words while they were engaged in a distractor task (Pulvermuller
et al., 2005b). Lexical decisions activated the left sensorimotor area
only for simple verbs with motor meanings and not for morpho-
logically complex verbs built on a motor stem (e.g., comprehend,
which contains the motor verb stem prehend; Ruschemeyer et al.,
2007). Sub-threshold TMS stimulation of the hand area of left M1
leads to a facilitatory effect (i.e., faster response times in a lexical
decision task) for arm- compared to leg-action-related words, and
the opposite effect has been found for leg-action-related words
after stimulation of the leg area (Pulvermuller et al., 2005a). The
excitability of the left M1 hand area (as determined by supra-
threshold stimulation and measured by motor evoked potentials,
MEPs) is modulated during a transformation task involving action
words as compared to non-action words (i.e., producing the singu-
lar/plural form of nouns or the third person singular/plural form
for verbs; Oliveri et al., 2004). Similarly, listening to hand-action-
related sentences decreased the amplitude of MEPs recorded from
hand muscles, while listening to sentences related to foot actions
modulated the MEPs recorded from foot muscles (Buccino et al.,
2005). TMS delivered at the end of the sentence over the leg
motor area in the left hemisphere caused larger MEPs recorded
from the right gastrocnemius and tibialis anterior muscles during
silent reading of legs related verbs included in literal, e.g., the man
runs in the beautiful country, metaphorical, e.g., the woman runs
with her fantasy often, and fictive motion sentences, e.g., the road
runs along the impetuous river, than with idiomatic motion, e.g.,
between the neighbors runs bad blood, or mental sentences (Cac-
ciari et al., 2011). Furthermore, silent reading of nouns referring
to tools elicited activations in the hand area and silent reading
of nouns referring foods elicited activation in regions implicated
in mouth and face movements (Carota et al., 2012). Also, passive
silent reading of hand verbs that described hand actions without
tool-use, tool verbs, and their semantic radicals indicated hand
involvement and tool verbs, and their semantic radicals indicated
the tools or materials showed common activations within the
hand-motion effect mask, in bilateral precentral gyrus (BA 4).
Silent reading of idiomatic vs. literal sentences involving hand-
and leg-related action words activated M1 when both idiomatic
and literal sentences were being processed (Boulenger et al., 2009).
A go/no-go lexical tone judgment task of Chinese tool-use action
verbs emphasizing the hand involvement or the tool or material
involvement and verbs that describe hand actions without tool-
use in which participants were instructed to press button when
the visually presented word had Tone 2 (low rising tone), activated
within the motor localized mask precentral gyrus (BA 4) bilaterally
for all three verb conditions (Yang and Shu, 2011). Silent reading of
a series of sentences with a verb depicting either a mental state (e.g.,
deceive, persuade) or an action (e.g., punch, kick), and answering
to a comprehension question that followed and required focusing
on the mental state of a protagonist in half of the cases and the
other half on actions involving a protagonist activated M1 (Kana
et al., 2012), activated M1 (Kana et al., 2012). Interestingly, M1
was activated despite verbs being presented in a third singular per-
son perspective, M1 was found activated in contrast with previous
studies in which authors doubted whether they did not found M1
activation because they used the third person perspective (Gilead
et al., 2013), consistently with a TMS study showing that motor
simulation occurs for verbs in the first, but not in the third per-
son perspective (Papeo et al., 2009). Semantic generation task, in
which participants were instructed to quickly describe how they
would physically interact with the visually presented pictures or
words referring to objects that are typically used by hand or the
foot, activated somatotopically M1 (Esopenko et al., 2012).
From the above mentioned literature it seems that it is nei-
ther the type of stimulus triggering M1 activation, since it appears
clear that action-related words do not automatically activate the
M1 cortex, nor the type of task, since it has been shown how,
for instance, silent reading of or passive listening to action-related
items might or might not activate the M1 cortex. This inconsis-
tency of M1 activation may be explained with subjects performing
or not performing mental simulation. These findings support our
hypothesis that M1 activation depends on whether or not subjects
choose to perform the motor imagery (explicitly or automatically)
to solve the task requirements. If subjects use the strategy of sim-
ulating the movement referred to by the (action) verbs, M1 is
activated; if, however, they use another strategy when solving the
task at hand, M1 cortex is not activated. Consistent with this view,
it has been shown that M1 cortex showed effector-specific activa-
tion for action hand verbs, as compared to non-manual actions
(e.g., to kneel) during an imagery task in which participants were
instructed to read the word, close their eyes, imagine performing
the action, and open their eyes to indicate that they had finished
motor imagery), but not during lexical decision (Willems et al.,
2010). Willems et al. (2010) found that parts of PM distinguished
manual from non-manual actions during both lexical decision and
imagery, but there was no overlap or correlation between regions
activated during the two tasks. Results from another study showed
that unless explicitly instructed to perform mental imagery, M1 is
not activated during language processing (Tomasino et al., 2007). A
top-down modulation of strategies could determine whether par-
ticipants do or do not perform mental simulation during language
task. The motor imagery based strategy might be at work especially
for tasks involving passive listening or passive silent reading and
lexical decisions. According to this idea, in the above mentioned
tasks involving action words (Pulvermuller et al., 2001, 2005a,b;
Oliveri et al., 2004; Buccino et al., 2005; Tettamanti et al., 2005)
subjects were free to use (or to refrain from using) the strategy of
simulating the actions. The subjects’ free choice in underspecified
task settings may explain why M1 is not always activated in the
fMRI studies involving action word stimuli. As a consequence, the
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above mentioned results suggest that listening to or silent reading
of action-related words items is not such a passive task as it is
held. This view is supported by studies showing how the crucial
factor that determines the activity in motor and premotor regions
during action word processing seems to be that the context in
which the word is presented. According to this view it has been
suggested that the lack of M1 activation might be due to subjects
not explicitly attending to the motor attributes of the words, rais-
ing the possibility that motor cortex modulation may occur only
when participants directly attend to the actions and their motor
properties (Kable et al., 2002, 2005). Cognitive studies suggest that
language comprehension may not be based on a full word-by-
word processing, and that the contextual meaning of the sentence
may influence the semantic processing of the upcoming words
(Marslen-Wilson and Tyler, 1980; Tyler and Wessels, 1983; Fer-
reira et al., 2002; Sanford and Sturt, 2002). Instructions too might
be responsible for triggering or not a given processing strategy.
It is known that cognitive processing of the same verbal stimuli
can be modulated by explicit instructions (Fink et al., 2002). In
the visuospatial domain, participants have been found to solve
the Landmark test, both by explicitly comparing the lengths of
the left and right line segments, and by computing the center of
mass of the display. Solving the same task, by using the two strate-
gies elicited different neural activations, with the explicit length
comparisons (relative to line center judgments) differentially acti-
vating the left superior posterior parietal cortex, with a tendency
toward activation of the equivalent area on the right, while the
reverse comparison revealed differential activation in the lingual
gyrus bilaterally and ACC (Fink et al., 2002).
Neuropsychological evidence supports the view of a top-down-
dependent involvement of the sensorimotor cortex in linguistic
processing. Neurosurgical patients with selective lesions of the
precentral and postcentral sulci silently read action-related verbs
(face-, hand-, and feet-related verbs plus neutral verbs) for sub-
sequent (i) motor imagery by vividness ratings and (ii) frequency
ratings. They showed a task× stimulus interaction: a lesion affect-
ing a part of the cortex that represents a body part also led to
slower RTs during the generation of mental images for verbs
describing actions involving that same body part. By contrast, no
category-related differences were seen in the frequency estimations
(Tomasino et al., 2012). Two arguments have been put forward to
rule out the possibility that sensorimotor activation during action
words processing was due to secondary imaginary processes. In
an attempt to minimize the influence of imagery, some authors
administered the linguistic task first, followed by the action exe-
cution or observation tasks (Boulenger et al., 2006, 2009). Others
suggested that the early neurophysiological activation spreading to
M1 cortex revealed by MEG (Pulvermuller et al., 2005b) strongly
speaks against the possibility that a second step imagery process is
required. The motor activation occurs at about 150 ms after pre-
sentation of a written word, when normally lexical and semantic
effects emerge (Pulvermuller et al., 2001, 2005a,b; Boulenger et al.,
2006).
To establish when motor imagery exerts its influence over the
sensorimotor activation, TMS has been applied at different points
in time (Tomasino et al., 2008). Similarly to what has been found
before (Pulvermuller et al., 2001, 2005a,b; Boulenger et al., 2006),
a specific modulation of response times found as early as 150 ms.
As a new feature, however, it has been clarified that the effect
of the TMS selectively modulated the response times during the
imagery task only, compared with the frequency judgment task
and the silent reading task used as control conditions, suggest-
ing that the effect of motor simulation occurs earlier (i.e., at
150 ms) than once thought (Pulvermuller et al., 2001, 2005a,b;
Boulenger et al., 2006). This result is consistent with previous
studies on motor imagery, showing that the activation of motor-
related brain areas associated with motor imagery occurs very
fast, within the first hundreds of milliseconds (Wang et al., 2010),
and with evidence of sensorimotor activation as early as 270–
390 ms after stimulus onset (Kawamichi et al., 1998). Lastly, similar
results can be found in memorization of action sentences with an
involvement of M1 detected between 150 and 250 ms after stim-
ulus onset (Masumoto et al., 2006). In conclusion, we argue that
an activation of M1 in word processing is comparable to what
has been shown in the mental rotation literature with individuals
solving the MR tasks by relying on different strategies. The view
that people can use different strategies while processing action-
related words hypothesizes that, in some circumstances, people
understand action verbs/sentences in part by emphasizing motor
representations of what it’s like to execute the designated action,
in part by emphasizing visual representations of what it’s like to
see the designated action. This view reinforces the parallel we are
drawing between mental rotation and action word processing. As
Taylor and Zwaan (2009) wrote to account for neuropsychologi-
cal data on action-related word processing: “(. . .) comprehension
relies on a multivariegated system for conceptual representation
that relies on experiential memory (including motor, sensory, and
intuitive experiential traces).” In addition, the top-down effect
produced by the strategy use is strengthened now by neuroimag-
ing evidence linking the visual-semantic motion features of action
verbs/sentences with the left posterolateral temporal cortex (for
a review, see Gennari, 2012). In this domain too it is held that
modality-specific brain regions processing visual motion such as
the middle temporal area or area V5 are not automatically or habit-
ually engaged in language processing (Gennari, 2012). The lack
of V5 activation in tasks in which motion information must be
recruited suggests that V5 activation in is not integral to motion
content processing per se, but rather it results from top-down influ-
ences or selective attention (Gennari, 2012). As it happens for the
M1 cortex, the middle temporal area or area V5 is susceptible to
top-down control and higher-level perceptual/conceptual influ-
ences: implied motion, apparent and illusory motion, “moving”
sounds, and imagined motion can all elicit significant levels of
activation in this area (Gennari, 2012). Similarly to M1 cortex, V5
responds more strongly when participants attend to motion com-
pared to when they do not, even when the visual stimulation is the
same (O’Craven et al., 1997).
Although it has been proposed that conceptual processing tran-
scends the distinction between bottom-up, stimulus-driven, auto-
matic processing, on the one hand, and top-down, strategy-driven,
controlled processing, on the other hand (Simmons and Barsalou,
2003; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2012), the effect of strategy used
during action-related verb processing might be still a promising
approach.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 27 | 8
Tomasino and Rumiati Top-down effects of strategies use
THE CASE OF NON-ACTION RELATED, NEGATIONS, AND
PSEUDO-VERBS WORD PROCESSING
The series of studies we have reviewed thus far clearly indicate that
the activations in the sensorimotor areas, observed while partic-
ipants are engaged in tasks involving non-action related words,
and those observed while participants perform mental rotation of
abstract stimuli (Kosslyn et al., 2001; Wraga et al., 2003) have
a lot in common. Motor activity has been observed not only
during action-related words processing, but also during reading
imageable concrete words with no motor content (D’Esposito
et al., 1997; Mellet et al., 1998; Pulvermuller and Hauk, 2006;
Postle et al., 2008), “non-words” with regular phonology (Pos-
tle et al., 2008), and pseudo-verbs (Shapiro et al., 2005, see p.
1060; Tomasino et al., 2010b). It has been shown that non-motor
related words and pseudo-verbs could activate (frontal) cortical
areas to a similar extent as action-related verbs (see also Roder
et al., 2002). Taken together these findings, in the measure in which
they show that activation in sensorimotor areas is not selectively
triggered by action-related word stimuli only, further weaken the
bottom-up hypothesis which, on the contrary, speaks for a type of
stimulus-dependent modulation of sensorimotor activation.
For instance, pseudo-verbs can activate motor areas, as it was
shown in a fMRI study using a lexical decision task on positive and
negative imperatives (Tomasino et al., 2010b). Importantly, these
motor activations were not modulated by the linguistic context,
in contrast to action-related verbs for which the motor activations
were systematically modulated by positive and negative contexts.
This result suggests that it is not the activation of the motor areas
per se that allows distinguishing the effect of action verbs from that
of pseudo-verbs, but rather the systematicmodulation of the motor
system activity by the linguistic context, which only occurs for
action verbs. Importantly, similar unspecific activations of motor
areas responses to “non-words” with regular phonology have been
observed also in other studies (Hagoort et al., 1999; Postle et al.,
2008).
Negations too have been found to both increase and decrease
sensorimotor areas. Sentential negation has been argued to tran-
siently reduce the access to mental representations of the negated
information (Tettamanti et al., 2008). Indeed, it has been found
that the activation in left fronto-parietal regions and the effective
connectivity in concept-specific embodied systems are reduced in
the case of action-related negative sentences (Tettamanti et al.,
2008). Similarly, activations in the hand region of the primary
motor and premotor cortices were found to be reduced for negative
hand-action-related imperatives, such as “Don’t grasp!” compared
to “Grasp!” (Tomasino et al., 2010b). Interestingly, the PM was
also found to be activated, rather than reduced, by negations in
other two studies involving a sentence-picture verification task
(Hasegawa et al., 2002). According to the two-step simulation
hypothesis of negation processing (Kaup and Zwaan, 2003; Kaup
et al., 2007, 2010), when the comprehender processes negations,
she creates a simulation of the negated state of affairs, and a
simulation of the actual state of affairs. Negation is implicitly
encoded in the deviation between both simulations (Ludtke et al.,
2008). Taken together these results indicate that negations acti-
vate the sensorimotor cortex depending on whether the strategy
of simulating the corresponding content of the sentences has or
not been blocked. In Tomasino et al. (2010b), simulation was
blocked by means of an experimental manipulation involving the
use of imperatives known, if heard, to refrain the participants
from performing the corresponding action. In a sentence–picture
verification paradigm, they might be free to apply the two-step
simulation strategy, leading to an activation of the sensorimo-
tor areas. Negation processing thus constitutes a further piece of
evidence of the top-down modulation of sensorimotor activations.
That motor representations are only engaged under specific
conditions and their effects are context-dependent is also sup-
ported by studies in which idiomatic sentences or metaphors are
used as stimuli. The activation of sensorimotor areas by metaphor-
ical or idiomatic phrases – which convey abstract concepts embed-
ded in concrete content – would support the theories that abstract
concepts are understood through analogies to sensation and action
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Gibbs, 2006; Bergen, 2007). While
Boulenger et al. (2009) found somatotopic activation for figura-
tive and literal action sentences involving leg and arm verbs, other
studies have yielded somewhat inconsistent results. For instance,
Aziz-Zadeh et al. (2006) found a somatotopically organized acti-
vation in the PM cortex for literal action sentences, but not for
idiomatic phrases, Raposo et al. (2009) too found an activation
in the premotor/motor regions for isolated action verbs, and to
a lesser extent for literal action sentences, but not for figurative
sentences using action verbs. These findings lend support to cog-
nitive theories of semantic flexibility, by showing that the nature
of the semantic context determines the degree to which alterna-
tive senses and particularly relevant features are processed when a
word is heard (Raposo et al., 2009).
The non-action related/abstract words are the last class of
stimuli we will review here that, included in fMRI studies as a
control condition, have been found to activate the sensorimotor
areas. Embodied theories vary for the level of embodiment they
assign to abstract concepts. The strong version of the embodied
hypothesis holds that abstract concepts, just like concrete ones,
are grounded in the sensorimotor system (Lakoff and Johnson,
1980; Glenberg et al., 2008). Others have proposed that abstract
and action-related word processing reflects a continuum rather
than a dichotomy (Scorolli et al., 2011) since in a rating study
about concreteness judgments on large sets of words a bimodal
distribution (according to features, such as tangibility or visibility
of the items), was found (Nelson and Schreiber, 1992). Evidence
in support of the stronger version of embodiment is shaky. In
fact, abstract sentences (e.g., to give some news) may (Glenberg
et al., 2008) or may not (Ruschemeyer et al., 2007) exactly acti-
vate motor information as concrete ones do (e.g., to give a pizza).
By comparing simple action-related verbs [such as “greifen” (to
grasp)] and complex abstract verbs [such as “begreifen” (to com-
prehend)], Ruschemeyer et al. (2007) showed that only the former,
triggered activity in premotor areas. Similarly, Tettamanti et al.
(2005) reported a selective activation of motor areas for concrete
sentences containing a manipulable object as opposed to sentences
containing abstract objects.
Here we propose that the activation of the sensorimotor areas
in association with abstract stimuli is most likely due to the inter-
vention of mental imagery. Implicit motor imagery is not uniquely
used when a body-related verb stimulus is encountered, and might
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be defined as a strategy implicitly triggered in association to generic
imageable words, and proved adequate for eliciting activity in
motor areas (Postle et al., 2008). The selected strategy can be
implicitly transferred from one stimulus to another. In Wraga
et al.’s (2003) study, while one group of participants saw a MR
of hands block followed by a MR of 3D cubes block, a differ-
ent group saw two sets of MR of 3D cubes blocks. They found
that the left M1 cortex, the left insula, and the PM area bilater-
ally were selectively activated in participants who performed the
MR of hand shapes before the MR of 3D cubes. By contrast, the
right superior parietal lobe and the right occipito-temporal junc-
tion were enhanced in participants who performed only the MR
of 3D cubes. The authors concluded that the motor strategy can
covertly be transferred to the imagined transformations of stim-
uli other than body parts such as abstract ones. In a recent fMRI
study, in which a similar implicit transfer of strategies paradigm
was applied to motor and non-motor related verbs processing
(Papeo et al., 2012), it was examined whether motor strategies
adopted during a motor imagery task creates a cognitive context
that would be implicitly transferred to a subsequent linguistic
task. Participants performed a mental rotation block of either
motor or visuospatial strategy, randomly presented before each
block of silent reading of verbs describing hand actions or physi-
cal/psychological states. Irrespective of the verb category, reading
following a mental rotation block of motor strategy, compared to
reading following a mental rotation block of visuospatial strategy,
increased activity in left primary motor cortex, bilateral PM and
right somatosensory cortex. Thus, the cognitive context induced
by the preceding motor strategy-based mental rotation modulated
word-related sensorimotor responses. In a recent TMS study of the
left M1 cortex (Scorolli et al., 2012; non-idiomatic), phrases com-
posed by abstract or concrete verbs combined with abstract or
concrete nouns (AA, CA, AC, CC) have been used. The authors
found an early motor activation with concrete verbs and a delayed
one with abstract verbs. This result first confirms the view that
abstract words (verbs) also activate the motor system related to
manual action. In addition, as to the delayed activation, authors
argue that it is likely that the effort to process abstract words in the
premotor cortex or other secondary areas is higher and therefore
determines a stronger modulatory influence on M1.
With respect to the possible transfer of strategy account, as
in this paradigm the context is induced by both action-related
or non-action related verbs, with combinations of abstract verbs
plus (abstract or concrete) nouns, the putative effect of transfer
would be attenuated. Nevertheless, one cannot exclude that a pre-
ceding block, in which concrete verbs and concrete nouns were
combined (e.g., grasp a pen), might have favored the transfer of a
(motor) strategy effect on the subsequent block of concrete verb
plus abstract noun, e.g., grasp an idea; or that a preceding block
in which abstract verbs and concrete nouns are combined (e.g.,
suspect a pen), might have prompted a transfer of (motor) strat-
egy effect, in this case triggered by the noun, on the subsequent
block of abstract verb plus abstract noun, e.g., suspect freedom
(i.e., non-sensible phrases). The results indeed showed greater
MEPs amplitude for non-sensible phrases containing concrete
verbs followed by abstract nouns).
Furthermore, as the timing of TMS is known to modulate
action word processing (Papeo et al., 2009), one cannot exclude
that an interaction between a putative transfer of strategies effect
and stimulation time occurred in Scorolli et al.’s study. Showing
that words with an abstract content can too enhance the sensori-
motor areas activation strongly implies that the type of stimulus
does not automatically trigger motor simulation as the embodied
hypothesis would predict.
CONCLUSION
To wrap up, in the case of both mental rotation and action word
processing, motor simulation is not automatically triggered by
the type of stimulus but by the type of strategy. We then argued
that the type of strategy selected depends on top-down modu-
lation such as the context and tasks demands. We also argued
that whether the sensorimotor cortex is or it is not activated is
determined by the type of strategy selected in word processing.
Thus, the motor simulation is neither automatic nor necessary to
language understanding. The top-down hypothesis instead holds
that motor activation is not automatically triggered by the type
of stimulus but by the type of strategy. Also the embodied cogni-
tion hypothesis, as it claims that “understanding” is sensory and
motor simulation, is not compatible with the view that the type of
strategy selected depends on top-down modulation of the context
and tasks demands. Rather the top-down hypothesis is in line with
the disembodied view the motor system may be activated but not
necessarily so (Mahon and Caramazza, 2005, 2008).
Our view is consistent with the notion of flexibility in language
representation whereby the degree to which a modality-specific
region contributes to a representation depends on the context
(Hoenig et al., 2008; van Dam et al., 2010b, 2012) in which con-
ceptual features are retrieved. Flexibility is characterized by the
relative presence or absence of activation in motor and perceptual
brain areas. The key idea is that words are associated with more
than one experiential feature; accordingly, word processing could
be modified by encouraging participants to focus on one propri-
ety vs. another. We also add that this top-down modulation might
exert its influence also in selecting the type of strategy adopted
while processing language. Our preferred view is that, as it hap-
pens in the mental rotation domain, neither the type of stimulus
nor the type of task seems to automatically trigger M1 activation.
Rather we propose that different strategies will cause participants
to lean on different sorts of sensorimotor representations. Accord-
ing to this view M1 activation depends on whether or not subjects
choose motor imagery (explicitly or automatically) as a strategy
to solve the task requirements. The subjects’ free choice in task
settings may explain why M1 is not always activated in the fMRI
studies involving action word stimuli. Particularly relevant here is
the result that neural activity in M1 cortex areas 4a and 4p seems to
be differentially modulated by attention to action (Binkofski et al.,
2002). Accordingly, it has been suggested that the lack of M1 activa-
tion might be due to subjects not explicitly attending to the motor
attributes of the words, thus raising the possibility that motor cor-
tex modulation may occur only when participants directly attend
to the actions and their motor properties. Lastly, this view is in
accordance with studies suggesting that a crucial factor for observ-
ing activity in motor and premotor regions during action word
processing seems to be that the context in which the word is pre-
sented supports a motor interpretation and that the word form as
a whole conveys a motor meaning (van Dam et al., 2012).
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